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I. Introduction 
Static  cost  efficiency  is  a  commonly  used  criterion  to  analyze  the  performance  of 
environmental policy instruments. This property is based on cost minimization, and states that 
marginal pollution abatement costs across firms should be equal. When polluting firms are 
heterogeneous, it is well-known that regulations based on uniform emission standards do not 
satisfy the static cost efficiency property. However, differentiated standards have their own 
disadvantages, which are mainly related to governments’ informational requirements or large 
associated  administrative  costs  (see,  among  others,  Kolstad  2000  and  Bohm  and  Russell 
1985).  
In practice, uniform emission standards are very commonly used, despite their disadvantages 
with respect to efficiency considerations. The main rationale for the use of uniform emission 
standards is the increasing certainty concerning the amount of pollution that will result from 
regulations  (Weitzman  1974).  For  example,  the  US  Clean  Water  Act  establishes  uniform 
water pollution discharge limits, independent on firms’ location. Also, noise regulations are 
often designed as uniform standards, such as the Belgian noise regulation
1 for music in public 
and private institutions and companies. Further, the national ambient air quality standards 
included in the US Clean Air Act are largely identical for the whole country. Moreover, bans 
on certain substances, such as CFCs or the use of oil-based paints in urban areas in the US, 
are by definition uniform standards.  
Given the extensive use of uniform standards in practice, our objective in this paper is to 
reconcile  their  use  with  cost  efficiency  considerations.  A  key  issue  in  our  analysis  is  to 
                                                 
1 Royal Decree 24 February 1977.   3 
recognize that effective pollution levels coincide with stipulated standards only when there are 
sufficient monitoring and sanctioning resources to induce firms to comply with the standards. 
Therefore, the enforcement strategy acts as a complementary instrument to uniform standards, 
and  we  show  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  it  can  completely  correct  for  their 
inefficiency. The results we obtain crucially depend on the stringency of the standard. In one 
extreme, if the standard is sufficiently lax, the inspection agency is primarily concerned about 
deterrence, and therefore, the best the agency can do (in the absence of budgetary restrictions) 
is  to  induce  firms  to  comply  with  the  standard.  If,  however,  the  standard  is  sufficiently 
stringent,  the  inspection  agency’s  actions  are  primarily  driven  by  concerns  about  firms’ 
abatement costs. In this case, we find that the best the agency can do is to design a uniform 
inspection strategy which induces non-compliance, and marginal abatement costs across firms 
will be equalized.  
Our results are especially relevant because, generally, static cost efficiency considerations of 
environmental policy instruments have ignored monitoring issues (see, among others, Kolstad 
2000, Bohm and Russell 1985 and Cropper and Oates 1992). Downing and Watson (1974) are 
the first to present a theoretical model of environmental policy enforcement, and Harford 
(1978) focuses on firms’ behavior with respect to imperfectly enforceable emission standards 
and taxes, but none of them studies efficiency issues related to the link of standards and 
monitoring  strategies.  In  fact,  most  of  the  previous  theoretical  literature  on  optimal 
monitoring considers a setting with homogenous firms or even a single firm; see, for example, 
Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1992), Cohen (1987), Garoupa (2001) or Arguedas (2008). Some 
consider heterogeneous firms, but none of them discusses the link between uniform emission 
standards and their monitoring strategy in achieving efficiency; see, for example, Rousseau   4 
and Proost (2005) and Garvie and Keeler (1994). The only exception we are aware of is Jones 
and Scotchmer (1990),  who investigate the reduction in the inefficiencies associated with 
uniform standards through the exercise of power over the agency’s enforcement budget. They 
show  that  requiring  the  agency  to  partially  self-finance  from  its  noncompliance  penalties 
mitigates the inefficient distribution of compliance among inspected classes of firms when 
cost information is imperfect. However, a crucial difference between Jones and Scotchmer 
(1990) and our work is that in theirs, the objective of the inspection agency is deterrence, 
independently on firms’ compliance costs, and they study how inefficiencies associated with 
compliance with uniform standards can be mitigated through the appropriate choice of the 
agency’s enforcement budget. By contrast, in our work, the agency is concerned not only 
about deterrence but also on firms’ abatement costs, and it can mitigate the inefficiencies of 
uniform standards through the appropriate choice of the monitoring strategy.  
Our  findings  depend  on  two  key  features,  namely,  the  consideration  of  a  hierarchical 
government and the incorporation of an inspection agency’s concerns about firms’ abatement 
costs into the objective function. With respect to the former, we assume that the government 
delegates the responsibility of law enforcement to an inspection agency. This assumption is 
consistent  with  empirical  evidence,  and  also  supported  in  a  variety  of  theoretical  papers, 
including Jones and Scotchmer (1990), Chander and Wilde (1992), Bose (1995) and Saha and 
Poole (2000). 
The  second  assumption  refers  to  the  fact  that  inspection  agencies  are  concerned  about 
balancing costs and benefits when deciding on monitoring. That is, inspection agencies do not 
act  as  strict  enforcers,  but  they  at  least  partially  consider  firms’  abatement  costs  in  their 
objective function. The choice of the objective function of the inspection agency has already   5 
been subject of debate.
2 For example, Harford and Harrington (1991) and Stranlund (2007) 
assume that part of the costs that the agency takes into account consist of the compliance cost 
burden  on  the  regulated industry.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  our work,  that  is,  the 
enforcer acts as a cost minimizer in order to attain a specific compliance goal. However, there 
exist other alternative assumptions for the agency’s objective function. For example, Garvie 
and  Keeler  (1994)  and  Hansen  et  al.  (2006)  assume  that  the  enforcer  minimizes  non-
compliance  subject  to  a  budget  constraint;  Schmutzler  and  Goulder  (1997)  and  Franckx 
(2002) consider that the agency acts as a social welfare maximizer; Jones and Scotchmer 
(1990)  assume  environmental  harm  minimization,  or  equivalently,  environmental  benefit 
maximization; and, finally, Helland (1998) suppose that agencies seek to maximize their net 
political support (for instance, the US EPA may fear criticism because of an enforcement 
action’s impact on the local economy). Furthermore, empirical studies that estimate the US 
EPA’s objective function from its enforcement actions have generated mixed results. Deily 
and Gray (1991) and Dion et al. (1998), for instance, reject the social welfare maximization 
model,  while  Gray  and  Deily  (1996)  find  evidence  in  support  of  environmental  harm 
minimization. As Heyes and Kapur (2009) conclude, there is considerable uncertainty about 
the agencies’ objectives in practice, since objective functions are usually not published and, if 
they are, the stated objective will often be too vague to interpret meaningfully (e.g. the EPA’s 
mission statement reads ‘To protect human health and the environment’). Overall, evidence 
seems to point to the conclusion that environmental inspection agencies are mainly concerned 
with deterrence and only on secondary level with the compliance cost burden placed on the 
regulated industry. As Firestone (2002) states, ‘it may be more reasonable to view them’ (i.e. 
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of the different arguments and assumptions made in various studies.   6 
EPA  enforcement  employees)  ‘as  violation-minimizing  policemen  whose  primary  goal  is 
general deterrence rather than social welfare maximization’.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In 
section  3,  we  derive  the  results.  In  section  4,  we  discuss  some  policy  implications.  We 
conclude in section 5. All the proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
II. Model 
We consider an industry composed of  N  firms that emit a hazardous pollutant. The emission 
level of firm i is denoted as 
o
i i e e ≤ , where 
o
i e  is the emission level without regulation in 




=∑   and  these  emissions  cause 
environmental damages equal to  ( ) D E  with  ( ) ' 0 D E >  and  ( ) " 0 D E ≥ . 
Each firm can reduce its emissions at a cost depending on the emission level  i e  and the 
parameter  i θ , which defines the firms’ type. The abatement costs of a firm of type  i θ  are 
represented by the function  ( ) , i i c e θ , which has the usual specification:  ( ) , 0 e i i c e θ <  for all 
0
i i e e < ,  ( )
0 , 0 e i i c e θ = ,  ( ) , 0 ee i i c e θ >  for all 
0
i i e e ≤  and  ( ) , eee i i c e θ  sufficiently small.  
For simplicity, we assume that the industry is characterized by two types of firms: high-cost 
firms ( ) H θ  and low-cost firms ( ) L θ . The number of high-cost (low-cost) firms is  H N  ( ) L N , 
such that  H L N N N + = . A high-cost firm has higher total and marginal abatement costs for   7 
each  level  of  emissions  than  a  low-cost  firm.  Thus,  ( ) ( ) , , H i L i c e c e θ θ >   and 
( ) ( ) , , e H i e L i c e c e θ θ < . Also, we assume  ( ) ( ) , , ee H i ee L i c e c e θ θ ≤ .  
In order to protect environmental quality, the regulator (or the government) has imposed a 
uniform emission limit or standard  e  on the firms in the industry. The stringency of the 
standard  and  the  associated  fine  in  case  a  firm  is  discovered  exceeding  the  standard  are 
determined by law. For simplicity, the fine F is assumed to be linear:
3 
  { } max 0; , 0. i F f e e f = − >  
We  assume  that  there  exists  an  inspection  agency  that  has  a  budget  0 B >   to  spend  on 
monitoring. We assume that the cost per inspection is  0 m >  and that monitoring is perfectly 
accurate. We denote by  i p  the probability that a firm of type  i is inspected by the agency, 
such that  0 1 i p ≤ ≤ . After the standard  e  and the fine f are made public knowledge, the 
agency announces an inspection probability  i p  for each firm type  { } , i H L ∈ . Then, each firm 
reacts to the regulatory policy by selecting the pollution level.
4  
The objective of each (risk-neutral) firm is to choose the pollution level that minimizes the 
sum  of  abatement  costs  and  expected  fines.  Therefore,  for  a  given  regulatory  policy 
{ } , , i e f p , a firm of type i solves the following problem: 
                                                 
3 In practice, a linear specification of fines is often encountered for civil fines, since this structure is easy to 
understand by firms, citizens and administrations. For example, the EPA’s Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil 
Penalty Policy (1991) describes the civil fines for violating air pollution standards as “$5000 for each 30% or 
fraction of 30% increment above the standard”.  
4 Our model is consistent with the fact that agencies responsible for law enforcement (inspection agencies) are 
better informed about the regulated firms than agents responsible for law design (the government). Therefore, it 
is conceivable that the latter sets uniform standards while the former uses differentiated inspection strategies.    8 
  ( ) { } min , max 0,
i
i i i i e c e p f e e θ + −     .  (1) 
On the other hand, the objective of the inspection agency is to choose inspection probabilities 
that maximize compliance with the regulation in place, balanced by concerns about the level 
of the associated firms’ abatement costs.
5 As in Keeler (1995), we introduce the parameter 
[ ] 0,1 ψ ∈  to reflect the importance given by the inspection agency to abatement costs as a 
fraction of that given to environmental damages. If  1 ψ = , the agency acts as a social costs 
minimizer. If  0 ψ = , the agency strictly acts as an enforcer and maximizes deterrence without 
taking firms’ costs into account. If abatement costs matter, but have a lower priority than 
deterrence, then 0 1 ψ < < . We treat the parameter ψ  as exogenous since it typically depends 
on a wide variety of factors such as past interactions with firms, political influence and the 
general  viewpoint  of  the  agency.  Therefore,  the  optimization  problem  of  the  inspection 
agency is the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
, min , , ,
. . ,
H L
H H L L H H H L L L p p
H H L L
D N e N e N c e N c e
st m N p N p B
ψ θ θ + + +    
+ ≤
 
considering  that  firms  react  strategically  to  the  regulatory  policy  { } , , i e f p ,  as  explained 
above. 
We solve the problem backwards to find the subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, we first 
study the optimal behavior of the firms, and then we analyze the inspection agency’s optimal 
strategy. 
 
                                                 
5 See the discussion in the introduction for a motivation of this objective function.   9 
III. Results 
First  we  look  at  the  firms’  behavior  when  they  are  confronted  with  a  uniform  emission 
standard.  Next  we  derive  the  optimal  inspection  strategy  for  the  environmental  agency 
conditional on the stringency of the standard and the monitoring budget. 
 
3.1 Firms’ behavior 
As explained in the previous section, firms choose their emissions levels so as to minimize 
expected costs, consisting of abatement costs and expected fines for non-compliance, see (1). 
The solution of this optimization problem is presented next. 
Lemma 1. Given { } , , i e f p , firm i’s optimal emission level, 
*










e i i i
i i
e i i i i
c e p f
e e e





   + − =    
 
The intuition of this result is straightforward. Given the policy { } , , , i e f p  the firm can decide 
to  either  comply  with  the  standard,  or  not.  The  optimal  strategy  is  to  comply  when  the 
marginal expected penalty for non-compliance is larger than the marginal abatement costs 
savings of exceeding the standard; that is, when  ( ) , . i e i p f c e θ ≥ −  In that case, the optimal 
strategy is 
*
i e e = .
6 However, the optimal strategy is to exceed the standard if the marginal 
expected penalty is below the marginal abatement cost savings at the standard. In that case, 
the  firm  will  choose  the  emission  level  such  that  marginal  abatement  cost  savings  and 
                                                 
6 In a static model such as ours, the firm never chooses an emission level strictly below the standard: it just 
increases abatement costs, but there are no penalty savings.   10 
marginal  expected  fines  are  equal.  Therefore, 
*
i e e >   and  ( )
* , 0. e i i i c e p f θ + =   Note  that 
* o
i i e e <  as long as  0 i p > . 
From lemma 1, we can immediately see that there exists a threshold inspection probability for 
each  firm  type,  such  that  compliance  is  ensured  above  that  threshold.  That  minimum 
probability required is:  






= −   (2) 
Obviously,  H L p p > , since  ( ) ( ) , , e H i e L i c e c e θ θ <  for all  i e . 
Thus,  i i p p ≥  ensures compliance with the standard, i.e., 
*
i e e = . However,  i i p p <  ensures 
that  firms  of  type  i  exceed  the  standard,  i.e., 
*
i e e > ,  where  ( )
* , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + = .  This 
expression defines an implicit relationship between the inspection probability and the induced 
emission level, such that: 














  (3) 
which represents the effect on emissions of a marginal increase in the inspection probability; 
the  larger  the  probability,  the  lower  the  emission  level.  Our  assumptions, 
( ) ( ) , , ee H i ee L i c e c e θ θ ≤   and  ( ) , eee i i c e θ   sufficiently  small,  ensure  that  the  impact  of  the 
inspection frequency on emissions is ‘almost’ constant, and that high-cost firms react more 
than  low-cost  firms  to  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  inspection  (in  terms  of  emission 
reduction), independently of the emission level. That is: 
  ( ) ( ) , ,
H L









.  (4)   11 
 
3.2 Agency behavior 
The inspection agency knows the specific type of each firm, and is thus able to differentiate 
its  monitoring  strategy  depending  on  the  type.  However,  monitoring  is  still  necessary  to 
formally document a violation so as to allow prosecution and sanctioning. As explained in the 
previous  section,  we  assume  that  achieving  compliance  (or  maximizing  deterrence)  is  a 
primary goal for an environmental inspection agency and that costs to firms matter only in 
varying  degrees  depending  on  the  situation.  The  agency’s  optimization  problem  is  the 
following:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
[ ]
, min , , ,
. . , 0; ; ; , ,
,
H L
H H L L H H H L L L p p
o
e i i i i i i
H H L L
D N e N e N c e N c e
st c e p f e e e e i H L
m N p N p B
ψ θ θ
θ
+ + +    
+ ≥ ≥ ≥ =
+ ≤
  (5) 
where the first three constraints represent the firms’ best responses, as established in Lemma 
1, and the last inequality restriction is the agency’s budgetary constraint. 
Before presenting the optimal inspection strategy, we define 
a
i e  as the emission level of firm 
type i preferred by the agency; that is, the one that minimizes the sum of external damages 
plus  the  weight  of  abatement  costs,  or  the  one  that  satisfies  the  optimality  condition 
( ) ( ) ' , 0
a a a
H H L L e i i D N e N e c e ψ θ + + = . Also, let 
a a a
H H L L E N e N e = + . Note that these preferred 
emission levels do not depend on existing legislation (i.e. the stringency of the emission 
standard) or on the agency’s available budget. Our assumptions ensure that 
a a
L H e e < . For a 
graphical illustration, see figure 1. 
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j p  be the residual probability such that 
R
j j i i B m N p N p   = +   , where  i p  is the 
threshold probability which induces type i firms to comply with the standard, see (2). 
Now, we are ready to present the characteristics of the inspection agency’s optimal policy. It 
is very important to point out that the stringency of the emission standard crucially influences 
the agency’s monitoring and enforcement options since the agency has no power to control 
firm behavior for emission levels below e .  
 
Proposition 1. The optimal inspection strategy( )
* * , H L p p  is the following: 
i)  If 
a
L e e <  (stringent standard), then: 

















( ) , e H H c e θ −  
( ) , e L L c e θ −  
a
L e  
a
H e    13 
b.  Else,  ( )
* * , H L p p   such  that  ( ) ( )





D E p f D E p f
p p
ψ ψ
∂ ∂     − = −     ∂ ∂
, 
where  ( )
* , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + =  and 
* *
H H L L B m N p N p   = +  . 
ii)  If 
a a
L H e e e ≤ <  (moderate standard), then: 
a.  If  ( ) '
H L L
D E
m N N p B
f ψ
 
  + ≤
   
￿
,  where  H H L E N e N e = + ￿ ￿   and  H e ￿   such 









L L p p = . 
b.  Else: 





D E p f D E p f
p p
ψ ψ
∂ ∂   − ≥ −       ∂ ∂
, then 
* R
H H p p = , 
*
L L p p = , 
such that 
R
H H L L B m N p N p   = +  . 
ii.  Else,  ( )
* * , H L p p   such  that    ( ) ( )





D E p f D E p f
p p
ψ ψ
∂ ∂     − = −     ∂ ∂
, 
where  ( )
* , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + =  and 
* *
H H L L B m N p N p   = +  .  
iii)  If 
a
H e e ≤ (lax standard), then: 
a.  If  [ ] H H L L m N p N p B + ≤ , then 
*
H H p p = , 
*
L L p p = . 
b.  Else: 





D E p f D E p f
p p
ψ ψ
∂ ∂   − ≥ −       ∂ ∂
,  then 
* R
j j p p = , 
*
i i p p = , 
such that 
R
j j i i B m N p N p   = +   ;  , , , i j H L i j = ≠ . 
ii.  Else,  ( )
* * , H L p p   such  that  ( ) ( )





D E p f D E p f
p p
ψ ψ
∂ ∂     − = −     ∂ ∂
, 
where  ( )
* , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + =  and 
* *
H H L L B m N p N p   = +  . 
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Assume first that the standard is sufficiently stringent (case i). If there are enough monitoring 
resources (case i.a), the agency can implement its most preferred outcome ( ) ,
a a
H L e e  by setting 
a uniform inspection strategy across firm types. Therefore, cost-efficiency can be achieved 
with  a  uniform  standard,  if  it  is  complemented  with  an  appropriate  uniform  monitoring 
strategy.  Note that this strategy implies that both types of firms exceed the standard  e . If, 
however, the monitoring budget is scarce (case i.b), the agency’s second best option is to treat 
firms differently. This option again implies that firms exceed the standard, and the optimal 
inspection strategy satisfies the property that the last monetary unit spent in each firm group 
has the same marginal effect on the sum of environmental damages and weighted abatement 
costs. 
Now,  assume  that  the  standard  is  set  at  a  moderate  level  (case  ii).  Contrasting  with  the 
previous case, the agency cannot implement its most preferred outcome ( ) ,
a a
H L e e , even if the 
monitoring budget is very large. The reason is because the standard is above 
a
L e  and firms 
never select a pollution level below the standard (see Lemma 1). As a consequence, the best 
the agency can do - if money is not a problem (case ii.a) - is to induce low-cost firms to fully 
comply with the standard and induce high-cost firms to select the pollution level  H e ￿ , which 
minimizes the sum of external damages and weighted abatement costs given that low-cost 
firms choose  e . Otherwise, the agency selects the interior optimal inspection strategy (case 
ii.b),  except  where  the  last  monetary  unit  spent  in  inspecting  the  low-cost  firms  at  the 
threshold level  L p  has a larger marginal impact (in absolute terms) on the environmental 
damages and the weighted abatement costs than that spent in inspecting the high-cost firms at   15 
the residual probability 
R
H p , that is, the one such that 
R
H H L L B m N p N p   = +  . If this is the 
case, the optimal strategy is 
*
L L p p = , 
* R
H H p p = . 
Finally,  if  the  standard  is  lax  (case  iii),  the  agency  cannot  implement  its  most  preferred 
outcome  ( ) ,
a a
H L e e  either, and now, the best it  can do under a large budget  (case iii.a) is 
motivating  both  firm  types  to  comply  with  the  standard  by  selecting  the  threshold 
probabilities 
*
H H p p = , 
*
L L p p = . However, if the monetary restriction is binding (case iii.b), 
the agency selects the interior optimal inspection strategy, except in the case where resources 
are best spent so that one of the types (either the low- or the high-cost one) complies. 
  
IV. Discussion 
The above results show that it is pointless to consider the welfare effect of a uniform emission 
standard as such without taking the mitigating effect of the monitoring strategy into account.  
We can first consider the case where the budget available for monitoring is sufficient to 
implement the agency’s best option. This corresponds to case a) defined in proposition 1 for 
each of the three different situations depending on the stringency of the emission standard. 
These three cases are illustrated in figure 2.  




If we consider a stringent uniform standard ( )
a
L e e < , the agency’s optimal strategy is to adopt 
a uniform inspection probability for all firms. This is set such that the expected marginal 
sanction for a violating firm is equal to the marginal social damage caused by that violation 






= = . Hence, the marginal expected fine acts 
as a non-linear Pigouvian tax (see also Sandmo 2002) and, as a consequence, the agency’s 
monitoring activity counteracts the inefficiency of the uniform emission standard. Jointly the 
emission standard and the inspection strategy provide the socially optimal solution if  1 ψ = . 
For 0 1 ψ < < , monitoring still ensures cost efficiency, even though it does no longer ensures 
allocative efficiency. 
Next, if we consider a moderate standard ( )
a a
L H e e e ≤ < , the inspection agency treats both firm 
types differently. The low-cost firms are forced to comply with the emission limit, while the 
high-cost firms are allowed to violate the regulation, such that the induced pollution level is 
a
L e   e
 
e  
( ) , e H H c e θ −  
a
H e  
a
H e   e
 
Case i.a   Case ii.a  
( ) , e H H c e θ −   ( ) , e H H c e θ −  
( ) , e L L c e θ −   ( ) , e L L c e θ −   ( ) , e L L c e θ −  
Case iii.a  
D’(E
a)/Ψ   17 
H e ￿ ,  where 
a
H H e e e < ≤ ￿ .
7  The  monitoring  strategy  thus  lowers  the  inefficiency  of  using  a 
uniform standard to regulate a heterogeneous industry.  
Thirdly, if we look at a lax standard  ( )
a
H e e ≤ , we find that the optimal inspection strategy 
again implies a differentiated approach. High-cost firms receive more regulatory attention 
than  low-cost  firms  and  are  inspected  more  frequently.  In  this  instance,  the  deterrence 
objective of the agency is dominant and the cost implications of the regulation for the firms 
are neglected. Both types of firms are therefore induced to comply with the regulation. 
Furthermore,  when  the  budgetary  constraint  is  binding  and  the  agency  has  insufficient 
resources to implement its preferred inspection strategy, we see that the optimal inspection 
strategy implies that the last euro spent on inspection in each group has the same marginal 
effect on the environmental damages and the weighted abatement costs (except in the corner 
solution cases, as explained in the previous section). Again we find that, despite the uniform 
emission standard in place, the monitoring strategy leads to a cost efficient outcome. 
Finally, we briefly discuss the extreme case where the agency is a strict enforcer (i.e.  0 ψ = ). 
The agency’s optimal monitoring strategy then implies devoting resources to those firms that 
react most strongly to an increase in inspections. As we know from expression (3), high-cost 
firms react more than low-cost firms to an increase in the probability of inspection for every 
possible emission level. Thus, from a strict deterrence point of view, the agency should first 
dedicate  resources  to  monitoring  high-cost  firms  until  H H p p =   and  only  then  start 
monitoring the low-cost firms. The agency focuses solely on compliance with the emission 
                                                 
7 Note that the pollution level 
H e ￿  coincides with 
a
H e  as long as the damage function is linear.   18 
standard  and  ignores  the  effects  on  firms’  abatement  cost  levels.  Again,  the  presence  of 
heterogeneous firms leads the agency to select a differentiated monitoring strategy, however, 
this strategy is no longer cost efficient except for a sufficiently lax emission standard and a 
sufficiently large budget (case iii.a in proposition 1). 
 
V. Conclusion 
By  looking  at  both  the  environmental  policy  instrument  and  the  associated  monitoring 
strategy, we have found that the efficiency disadvantage of uniform emission standards is 
substantially  alleviated  by  the  agency’s  inspection  policy.  Thus  the  criticism  of  uniform 
regulatory standards may be overstated. Important conditions for this improvement in the 
efficiency  of  the  environmental  policy  are  the  availability  of  sufficient  resources  for  the 
inspection agency and the incorporation of abatement cost considerations in the agency’s 
objective function. Therefore, it might be desirable to influence the form of the agency’s 
objective function by increasing the weight attached to firms’ compliance costs. This could be 
done, for example, by changing the agency’s mission statement combined with independent, 
external evaluation of the agency’s performance.   
Our results stress the importance of looking at the complete regulatory chain when evaluating 
a policy’s impact, consisting of the environmental policy instrument as well as the monitoring 
and enforcement strategy. In fact, the nominal standards stipulated in legislative texts might 
differ  from  the  effective  standards  represented  by  the  pattern  of  compliance  induced  by 
monitoring and enforcement.    19 
VI. Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. The first order conditions of this optimization problem are:
8 




e i i i
i i
c e p f




≥ − ≥ − =
 
where  0 λ ≥  is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated to the inequality restriction. Easily 
combining these conditions, we obtain the desired result. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is the following:  






H H L L H H H L L L i i i i i
i H L i H L
H H L L
L D N e N e N c e N c e e e e e
m N p N p B
ψ θ θ α β
γ
= =
  = + + + − − − −      
  + + −  
∑ ∑
 
where  0, 0, 0 i i α β γ ≥ ≥ ≥   are  the  corresponding  lagrange  multipliers  and  ( ) , H L e e   are 
implicitly obtained from the expression  ( ) , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + = .
9    
The optimality condition is the following: 
( ) ' , 0
i i i i
i i e i i i i i
i i i i
e e e e
D N N c e N m
p p p p
ψ θ α β γ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ − + + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂









  is  given  by  (3).  Assuming  positive  inspection  probabilities  (which  imply 
o
i i e e > ), we then have  0 i β = , which reduces the optimality condition to: 
 
                                                 
8 Given the assumptions of our model, these are necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum. The same 
applies for the other optimization problem in the paper. 
9 This is obvious under non-compliance. Under compliance,  ( ) , 0
e i i c e p f θ + >  would imply to spend more 
monitoring resources than needed to induce firms to comply (see also (2)).    20 
( ) ' , 0
i
i i e i i i i
i
e
D N N c e N m
p
ψ θ α γ
∂
+ − + =     ∂
,  , i H L = .        (6) 
Case (i). A stringent standard 
a
L e e < . 
First consider  0 γ =  (i.e., the budget constraint is not binding). The optimality condition (6) 
reduces to:  









. Since  0 i α ≥ , we then have  ( ) ' , 0 e i i D c e ψ θ + ≥ , which necessarily implies that 
a
i i e e ≥ .  A  stringent  standard 
a
L e e <   implies  i e e >   (full  non-compliance)  and,  therefore, 
0 i α = . Thus: 
( ) ' , 0 e i i D c e ψ θ + = ,  , i H L = , 
which implies 
a
i i e e = . Since  ( ) , 0 e i i i c e p f θ + = , we then have  ( ) ' 0
a
i D E p f ψ − = ,  , i H L = , 









> , we have  0 γ >  (the budget constraint is binding). If full non-
compliance is the desired outcome without budgetary restrictions, inspection probabilities are 
even lower with monetary constraints. Therefore, full non-compliance is induced as well, that 
is,  i e e >  and  0 i α = . Thus, the optimality condition (6) reduces to: 











,  , i H L = . 
Therefore, we obtain:  
( ) ( ) ' , ' ,
H L
e H H e L L
H L
e e
D c e D c e
p p
ψ θ ψ θ
∂ ∂
+ = +         ∂ ∂
.   21 
 
Case (ii). A moderate standard 
a a
L H e e e ≤ < . 
First consider  0 γ = . The optimality condition (6) reduces to:  









.  Since  0 i α ≥ ,  we  then  have  ( ) ' , 0 e i i D c e ψ θ + ≥ ,  which  necessarily  implies 
a
i i e e ≥ . A moderate standard 
a a
L H e e e ≤ <  implies  H e e >  and  L e e =  and, therefore,  0 H α =  








and  L L p p = , where  H H L E N e N e = + ￿ ￿ , which is possible only if  ( ) '
H L L
D E
m N N p B
f ψ
 
  + ≤
   
￿
. 
However, if  ( ) '
H L L
D E
m N N p B
f ψ
 
  + >
   
￿
, we have  0 γ > . With enough monitoring resources, 
it  is  desirable  to  induce  high-cost  firms  to  exceed  the  standard,  as  we  have  just  proven. 
Therefore, with less resources, this is also the case and, therefore,   H e e >  and  0 H α = . Now, 
condition (6) varies with the type of firm: 









+ + =     ∂
,  
( ) ' , 0
L L
e L L L
L L
e e
D c e m
p p
ψ θ γ α
∂ ∂
+ + = ≤     ∂ ∂
. 
First,  0 L α =  implies  L e e > , and the interior condition obtained in case (i) above is also 
derived  here.  However,  0 L α ≥   implies  L e e = ,  which  is  possible  only  if   22 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' , ' ,
H L
e H H e L
H L
e e
D E c e D E c e
p p
ψ θ ψ θ
∂ ∂
+ ≥ +         ∂ ∂
.  In  this  case,  we  have 
* R
H H p p = , 
*










Case (iii). A lax standard 
a
H e e ≤ . 
First consider  0 γ = . The optimality condition (6) reduces to:  









.  Since  0 i α ≥ ,  we  then  have  ( ) ' , 0 e i i D c e ψ θ + ≥ ,  which  necessarily  implies 
a
i i e e ≥ .  A  lax  standard 
a
H e e ≤   then  implies  i e e =   and  0 i α ≥ .  Thus,  i i p p = ,  which  is 
possible only if  [ ] H H L L m N p N p B + ≤ . 
However, if  [ ] H H L L m N p N p B + > , we have  0 γ > . Now, the result follows using the same 
procedure as in case (ii) above, and considering the two possible cases of full non-compliance 
( 0 H L α α = = ) and partial compliance ( 0 i α > ,  0 j α = ). 
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